fsquirt_abuse_malicious_cpl_load.yml #487
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Clarified the description to indicate potential abuse of malicious CPL.
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@wietze Could you please review this PR which I provided very details information . |
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Proxy Execution via fsquirt.exe Loading Control Panel Applet
This PR documents fsquirt.exe as a Windows-signed helper binary that can be abused for execution via implicit Control Panel applet loading.
When executed from a non-system directory, fsquirt.exe resolves and loads bthprops.cpl from its current working directory. This allows execution of a user-supplied Control Panel applet under the context of a trusted Microsoft binary, without directly invoking a suspicious executable.
This behavior has been observed in real-world activity, including campaigns attributed to the SideWinder APT group, where malicious Control Panel applets were used for execution and defense evasion. reference: https://securelist.com/sidewinder-apt/114089/
The included example demonstrates how fsquirt.exe can be combined with a crafted bthprops.cpl to proxy execution through a legitimate Windows component, potentially reducing behavioral detection and alerting.
Simulation Results Step by step
Created and Run under non-system directory
Procmon results for proof
Sysmon EventID 7 result for proof
Own detection file uploaded
image_load_win_fsquirt_dll_load_from_non_system_paths.yml