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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughIntroduces six new public PostgreSQL functions for retrieving organizational metrics with built-in authorization controls and caching. Functions compute per-app metrics, global aggregated metrics, and total metrics across specified date ranges, validating access permissions and leveraging cache mechanisms to optimize queries. Changes
Sequence DiagramsequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant Auth as Authorization
participant DB as Database
participant Cache as Metrics Cache
participant Compute as Computation
Client->>Auth: Request metrics (org_id, date range)
alt Service Role
Auth-->>DB: Allow (bypass)
else Regular User
Auth->>DB: Check permissions & org
DB-->>Auth: Validate rights
alt Unauthorized
Auth-->>Client: Deny (log event)
else Authorized
Auth-->>DB: Proceed
end
end
DB->>Cache: Check cache validity
alt Cache Valid & Recent
Cache-->>Client: Return cached metrics
else Cache Stale or Missing
DB->>Compute: Seed metrics
Compute->>Cache: Store results
Cache-->>Client: Return metrics
end
Estimated code review effort🎯 4 (Complex) | ⏱️ ~45 minutes Possibly related PRs
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
supabase/migrations/20260226100000_fix_metrics_rpcs_org_authorization.sql (1)
1-3: Consider adding explicit GRANT statements to document access intent.The migration creates public functions without explicit
GRANTorREVOKEstatements. While PostgreSQL defaults grant EXECUTE to PUBLIC for new functions and the authorization is enforced internally, explicit grants improve clarity and make the security model auditable.📝 Example: Explicit grants at end of migration
-- Explicitly grant to authenticated and anon for RPC access GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.get_app_metrics(uuid) TO authenticated, anon; GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.get_app_metrics(uuid, date, date) TO authenticated, anon; GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.get_global_metrics(uuid) TO authenticated, anon; GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.get_global_metrics(uuid, date, date) TO authenticated, anon; GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.get_total_metrics(uuid) TO authenticated, anon; GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.get_total_metrics(uuid, date, date) TO authenticated, anon;🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed. In `@supabase/migrations/20260226100000_fix_metrics_rpcs_org_authorization.sql` around lines 1 - 3, Add explicit GRANT/REVOKE statements for the created RPC functions to document and lock down access intent: for each function created (get_app_metrics(uuid), get_app_metrics(uuid, date, date), get_global_metrics(uuid), get_global_metrics(uuid, date, date), get_total_metrics(uuid), get_total_metrics(uuid, date, date)) add GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION ... TO authenticated, anon (or the appropriate roles) at the end of the migration and consider REVOKE EXECUTE ON FUNCTION ... FROM PUBLIC if you want to remove the default public execute privilege so the authorization model is auditable and explicit.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In `@supabase/migrations/20260226100000_fix_metrics_rpcs_org_authorization.sql`:
- Around line 173-208: Remove the redundant authorization block that duplicates
get_app_metrics' checks: delete the v_is_service_role/v_user_id check and the IF
NOT v_is_service_role ... END IF; block (including the calls to
public.get_identity, public.check_min_rights, public.pg_log and the early
RETURN) so this function simply calls public.get_app_metrics and returns its
aggregated results; keep the initial v_is_service_role assignment only if used
elsewhere, otherwise remove its declaration too.
---
Nitpick comments:
In `@supabase/migrations/20260226100000_fix_metrics_rpcs_org_authorization.sql`:
- Around line 1-3: Add explicit GRANT/REVOKE statements for the created RPC
functions to document and lock down access intent: for each function created
(get_app_metrics(uuid), get_app_metrics(uuid, date, date),
get_global_metrics(uuid), get_global_metrics(uuid, date, date),
get_total_metrics(uuid), get_total_metrics(uuid, date, date)) add GRANT EXECUTE
ON FUNCTION ... TO authenticated, anon (or the appropriate roles) at the end of
the migration and consider REVOKE EXECUTE ON FUNCTION ... FROM PUBLIC if you
want to remove the default public execute privilege so the authorization model
is auditable and explicit.
supabase/migrations/20260226100000_fix_metrics_rpcs_org_authorization.sql
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fix: webapp url
This reverts commit ff20d1a.
Builder availability errors (not configured, call failed, error response, missing upload URL) are transient server-side failures, not client errors. Returning 503 allows the CLI retry logic to automatically retry these requests instead of treating them as terminal 400 errors.
fix: return 503 for service_unavailable build errors
fix: correct vue/html-indent in DemoOnboardingModal
… map to camelCase for builder
Extract buildBuilderPayload() from the inline fetch body so the snake_case → camelCase mapping and exact key set can be tested. 6 vitest cases verify: camelCase output, no legacy credentials field, correct metadata keys, and pass-through of contents.
Add unit tests for builder payload shape
Old CLI clients sending the flat `credentials` field would have it silently dropped, causing confusing builder failures. Now the proxy explicitly rejects non-empty `credentials` with a migration message pointing to `build_credentials`.
…t SQL injection The appId parameter was directly interpolated into the D1 SQL query string, creating a SQL injection vulnerability. Switched to bound parameter via .bind(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
fix(security): RBAC security audit fixes
* fix(auth): block account deletion for unverified users * fix(auth): refresh session fields for email verification gate * fix(auth): make delete_user insert idempotent * fix(auth): explain blocked delete/settings when email unverified * fix(auth): block delete action when email is unverified * fix(auth): localize resend email block and make delete_user idempotent
* fix(db): restrict invite_user_to_org public rpc * fix(db): use caller identity in invite 2FA check
* fix(db): secure record_build_time rpc writes * fix(db): preserve service-role record_build_time path
* fix(api): preserve channel owner on channel upsert * fix(auth): block sensitive account actions for unverified users (#1690) * fix(auth): block account deletion for unverified users * fix(auth): refresh session fields for email verification gate * fix(auth): make delete_user insert idempotent * fix(auth): explain blocked delete/settings when email unverified * fix(auth): block delete action when email is unverified * fix(auth): localize resend email block and make delete_user idempotent * Restrict invite_user_to_org RPC to authenticated callers (#1710) * fix(db): restrict invite_user_to_org public rpc * fix(db): use caller identity in invite 2FA check * fix(security): restrict webhook select to admin users (#1705) * Secure record_build_time RPC for authorized callers (#1711) * fix(db): secure record_build_time rpc writes * fix(db): preserve service-role record_build_time path * fix(api): preserve channel owner on channel upsert
* fix(security): restrict apikey oracle rpc access * fix: webapp url * fix: fix * chore(release): 12.116.9 * fix: envs * Revert "Merge pull request #1707 from Cap-go/fix_webapp_url" This reverts commit ff20d1a. * fix: typo * chore(release): 12.116.10 * fix(security): restrict apikey oracle rpc access * fix: return 503 instead of 400 for service_unavailable build errors Builder availability errors (not configured, call failed, error response, missing upload URL) are transient server-side failures, not client errors. Returning 503 allows the CLI retry logic to automatically retry these requests instead of treating them as terminal 400 errors. * chore(release): 12.116.11 * fix: update PWD script * fix: env vars * fix: modal responsive * feat: forward buildOptions + buildCredentials to builder (pass-through) * fix: correct vue/html-indent in DemoOnboardingModal * fix: use snake_case (build_options, build_credentials) in public API, map to camelCase for builder * fix(security): sanitize SQL interpolation in Cloudflare Analytics Engine queries (#1702) * chore(release): 12.116.12 * Add unit tests for builder payload shape contract Extract buildBuilderPayload() from the inline fetch body so the snake_case → camelCase mapping and exact key set can be tested. 6 vitest cases verify: camelCase output, no legacy credentials field, correct metadata keys, and pass-through of contents. * Reject deprecated `credentials` field with clear upgrade error Old CLI clients sending the flat `credentials` field would have it silently dropped, causing confusing builder failures. Now the proxy explicitly rejects non-empty `credentials` with a migration message pointing to `build_credentials`. * fix(security): clean up role_bindings on member removal (#1722) * chore(release): 12.116.13 * fix(security): use parameterized query in getStoreAppByIdCF to prevent SQL injection The appId parameter was directly interpolated into the D1 SQL query string, creating a SQL injection vulnerability. Switched to bound parameter via .bind(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): prevent privilege escalation in role_bindings endpoint Add priority_rank check so callers cannot assign or update roles with higher privileges than their own. Without this, any user with org.update_user_roles could escalate to org_super_admin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): enforce is_assignable in role_bindings INSERT RLS policy Direct PostgREST inserts could bypass the endpoint's is_assignable check and assign non-assignable roles (e.g. platform_super_admin). The RLS INSERT policy now requires the target role to have is_assignable = true. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): cascade all role bindings on member removal delete_org_member_role previously only deleted the org-level binding, leaving orphaned app/channel bindings. A removed member could retain app-level access. Now deletes all bindings for the user in the org. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): add trigger to prevent deleting last super_admin binding Direct PostgREST DELETEs on role_bindings could bypass the last super_admin guards in delete_org_member_role. A BEFORE DELETE trigger now rejects deletion of the last org_super_admin binding in any org. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): support hashed API keys in rbac_check_permission_direct The RBAC path in rbac_check_permission_direct looked up API keys with WHERE key = p_apikey, which silently failed for hashed keys. Switched to find_apikey_by_value() which handles both plain-text and hashed keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reword comment to pass typos CI check Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove unused desc import from role_bindings.ts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): add FOR UPDATE lock to prevent write-skew on last super_admin delete Two concurrent DELETE transactions could both pass the count check and both delete their rows, leaving zero super_admins. A SELECT ... FOR UPDATE on the super_admin binding set now serializes concurrent deletes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: prevent API key privilege escalation and fix organization member deletion test - Add validation to prevent limited API keys from creating unlimited keys - Fix organization-api test to work with sync_org_user_to_role_binding trigger - Change test user_right from 'invite_read' to 'read' (trigger-compatible) - Verify trigger-created role_bindings instead of manually inserting them * fix: allow CASCADE deletions in prevent_last_super_admin_binding_delete and fix RBAC test compatibility - Add org existence check in trigger to allow CASCADE deletions when org is being deleted - Add service_role bypass for administrative operations and tests - Update tests to work with RBAC security constraints: - 34_test_rbac_rls.sql: Remove DELETE operation that violated super_admin protection - 35_test_is_admin_rbac.sql: Use service_role for test setup INSERT - All SQL database tests now pass (860 tests) - Backend tests remain passing (68 tests) * fix(security): make getCallerMaxPriorityRank auth-type-aware and remove API key data leak * chore(release): 12.116.14 * fix(security): correct API key RBAC principal mapping and remove service_role bypass * fix(security): correct RBAC migration comments and add privilege check on delete - Update migration comments to accurately reflect that service_role is NOT exempt from the last super_admin protection trigger - Replace FOR UPDATE scan with pg_advisory_xact_lock to avoid cross-transaction deadlocks - Add privilege-rank check in delete handler to prevent deleting higher-ranked role bindings - Aligns with established advisory lock patterns in codebase Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-opencode) Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai> * fix: add self-2fa-required message for 2FA enforcement in multiple languages * chore(release): 12.116.15 * fix(frontend): validate 2fa before enabling org enforcement (#1729) * chore(release): 12.116.16 * fix(deps): update vue monorepo to v3.5.29 (#1731) Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(release): 12.116.17 * chore: remove unused cloudflare function getStoreAppByIdCF * chore(release): 12.116.18 * chore: stop editing immutable base migration * fix(frontend): disable auto demo onboarding modal (#1733) * chore(release): 12.116.19 * fix(auth): block sensitive account actions for unverified users (#1690) * fix(auth): block account deletion for unverified users * fix(auth): refresh session fields for email verification gate * fix(auth): make delete_user insert idempotent * fix(auth): explain blocked delete/settings when email unverified * fix(auth): block delete action when email is unverified * fix(auth): localize resend email block and make delete_user idempotent * Restrict invite_user_to_org RPC to authenticated callers (#1710) * fix(db): restrict invite_user_to_org public rpc * fix(db): use caller identity in invite 2FA check * fix(security): restrict webhook select to admin users (#1705) * Secure record_build_time RPC for authorized callers (#1711) * fix(db): secure record_build_time rpc writes * fix(db): preserve service-role record_build_time path * fix(security): restrict apikey oracle rpc access * chore: stop editing immutable base migration * fix(security): restrict apikey oracle rpc access * chore(release): 12.116.20 * fix(security): restrict apikey oracle rpc access * chore: stop editing immutable base migration * fix(security): restrict apikey oracle rpc access * chore: stop editing immutable base migration * fix(security): restrict apikey oracle rpc access --------- Co-authored-by: WcaleNieWolny <isupermichael007@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: WcaleNieWolny <50914789+WcaleNieWolny@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: LOLO <131777939+artylobos@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Jordan Lorho <jordan.lorho@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai> Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
…go/capgo into riderx/fix-rpc-metrics-auth
* fix(db): restrict rescind_invitation rpc access * test(db): cover rescind_invitation permission edges
* fix(db): restrict upsert_version_meta rpc writes * fix(db): simplify upsert_version_meta service-role guard * fix(db): remove runtime checks from upsert_version_meta * fix(db): restrict upsert_version_meta execute privileges * fix(supabase): keep upsert_version_meta privilege-only * fix(db): rename upsert_version_meta migration to unique version
…go/capgo into riderx/fix-rpc-metrics-auth
…go/capgo into riderx/fix-rpc-metrics-auth
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Summary (AI generated)
supabase/migrations/20260226100000_fix_metrics_rpcs_org_authorization.sqlto enforce organization membership checks on metrics RPC endpoints and prevent anonymous cross-tenant usage telemetry disclosure.get_app_metrics,get_global_metrics, andget_total_metricsexecution paths so requests now require valid read rights for the requested org and log denied attempts.Test plan (AI generated)
bun lint:backendanonkey and verify unauthorized org IDs no longer return cross-tenant rows.Screenshots (AI generated)
Checklist (AI generated)
bun run lint:backend && bun run lint.Summary by CodeRabbit