diff --git a/src/SUMMARY.md b/src/SUMMARY.md
index cf316a63f1d..1e39ae3a290 100644
--- a/src/SUMMARY.md
+++ b/src/SUMMARY.md
@@ -860,6 +860,7 @@
   - [WWW2Exec - GOT/PLT](binary-exploitation/arbitrary-write-2-exec/aw2exec-got-plt.md)
   - [WWW2Exec - \_\_malloc_hook & \_\_free_hook](binary-exploitation/arbitrary-write-2-exec/aw2exec-__malloc_hook.md)
 - [Common Exploiting Problems](binary-exploitation/common-exploiting-problems.md)
+- [Adreno A7xx Sds Rb Priv Bypass Gpu Smmu Kernel Rw](binary-exploitation/linux-kernel-exploitation/adreno-a7xx-sds-rb-priv-bypass-gpu-smmu-kernel-rw.md)
 - [Ksmbd Streams Xattr Oob Write Cve 2025 37947](binary-exploitation/linux-kernel-exploitation/ksmbd-streams_xattr-oob-write-cve-2025-37947.md)
 - [Linux kernel exploitation - toctou](binary-exploitation/linux-kernel-exploitation/posix-cpu-timers-toctou-cve-2025-38352.md)
 - [PS5 compromission](binary-exploitation/freebsd-ptrace-rfi-vm_map-prot_exec-bypass-ps5.md)
diff --git a/src/binary-exploitation/linux-kernel-exploitation/adreno-a7xx-sds-rb-priv-bypass-gpu-smmu-kernel-rw.md b/src/binary-exploitation/linux-kernel-exploitation/adreno-a7xx-sds-rb-priv-bypass-gpu-smmu-kernel-rw.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..537abe45c59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/binary-exploitation/linux-kernel-exploitation/adreno-a7xx-sds-rb-priv-bypass-gpu-smmu-kernel-rw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# Adreno A7xx SDS->RB privilege bypass (GPU SMMU takeover to Kernel R/W)
+
+{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
+
+This page abstracts an in-the-wild Adreno A7xx microcode logic bug (CVE-2025-21479) into reproducible exploitation techniques: abusing IB-level masking in Set Draw State (SDS) to execute privileged GPU packets from an unprivileged app, pivoting to GPU SMMU takeover and then to a fast, stable kernel R/W via a dirty-pagetable trick.
+
+- Affected: Qualcomm Adreno A7xx GPU firmware prior to a microcode fix that changed masking of register $12 from 0x3 to 0x7.
+- Primitive: Execute privileged CP packets (e.g., CP_SMMU_TABLE_UPDATE) from SDS, which is user-controlled.
+- Outcome: Arbitrary physical/virtual kernel memory R/W, SELinux disable, root.
+- Prereq: Ability to create a KGSL GPU context and submit command buffers that enter SDS (normal app capability).
+
+## Background: IB levels, SDS and the $12 mask
+
+- The kernel maintains a ringbuffer (RB=IB0). Userspace submits IB1 via CP_INDIRECT_BUFFER, chaining to IB2/IB3.
+- SDS is a special command stream entered via CP_SET_DRAW_STATE:
+  - A6xx: SDS is treated as IB3
+  - A7xx: SDS moved to IB4
+- Microcode tracks the current IB level in register $12 and gates privileged packets so they are only accepted when the effective level corresponds to IB0 (kernel RB).
+- Bug: A7xx microcode kept masking $12 with 0x3 (2 bits) instead of 0x7 (3 bits). Since IB4 & 0x3 == 0, SDS was misidentified as IB0, allowing privileged packets from user-controlled SDS.
+
+Why it matters:
+
+```
+A6XX                | A7XX
+RB  & 3       == 0  |  RB  & 3       == 0
+IB1 & 3       == 1  |  IB1 & 3       == 1
+IB2 & 3       == 2  |  IB2 & 3       == 2
+IB3 (SDS) & 3 == 3  |  IB3 & 3       == 3
+                    |  IB4 (SDS) & 3 == 0   <-- misread as IB0 if mask is 0x3
+```
+
+Microcode diff example (patch switched the mask to 0x7):
+
+```
+@@ CP_SMMU_TABLE_UPDATE
+- and $02, $12, 0x3
++ and $02, $12, 0x7
+@@ CP_FIXED_STRIDE_DRAW_TABLE
+- and $02, $12, 0x3
++ and $02, $12, 0x7
+```
+
+## Exploitation overview
+
+Goal: From SDS (misread as IB0) issue privileged CP packets to re-point the GPU SMMU to attacker-crafted page tables, then use GPU copy/write packets for arbitrary physical R/W. Finally, pivot to a fast CPU-side R/W via dirty pagetable.
+
+High-level chain
+- Craft a fake GPU pagetable in shared memory
+- Enter SDS and execute:
+  - CP_SMMU_TABLE_UPDATE -> switch to fake pagetable
+  - CP_MEM_WRITE / CP_MEM_TO_MEM -> implement write/read primitives
+  - CP_SET_DRAW_STATE with run-now flags (dispatch immediately)
+
+GPU R/W primitives via fake pagetable
+- Write: CP_MEM_WRITE to an attacker-chosen GPU VA whose PTEs you map to a chosen PA -> arbitrary physical write
+- Read: CP_MEM_TO_MEM copies 4/8 bytes from target PA to a userspace-shared buffer (batch for larger reads)
+
+Notes
+- Each Android process gets a KGSL context (IOCTL_KGSL_GPU_CONTEXT_CREATE). Switching contexts normally updates SMMU tables in the RB; the bug lets you do it in SDS.
+- Excessive GPU traffic can cause UI blackouts and reboots; reads are small (4/8B) and sync is slow by default.
+
+## Building the SDS command sequence
+
+- Spray a fake GPU pagetable into shared memory so at least one instance lands at a known physical address (e.g., via allocator grooming and repetition).
+- Construct an SDS buffer containing, in order:
+  1) CP_SMMU_TABLE_UPDATE to the physical address of the fake pagetable
+  2) One or more CP_MEM_WRITE and/or CP_MEM_TO_MEM packets to implement R/W using your new translations
+  3) CP_SET_DRAW_STATE with flags to run-now
+
+The exact packet encodings vary by firmware; use freedreno’s afuc/packet docs to assemble the words, and ensure the SDS submission path is taken by the driver.
+
+## Finding Samsung kernel physbase under physical KASLR
+
+Samsung randomizes the kernel physical base within a known region on Snapdragon devices. Brute-force the expected range and look for the first 16 bytes of _stext.
+
+Representative loop
+
+```c
+while (!ctx->kernel.pbase) {
+  offset += 0x8000;
+  uint64_t d1 = kernel_physread_u64(ctx, base + offset);
+  if (d1 != 0xd10203ffd503233f) continue;   // first 8 bytes of _stext
+  uint64_t d2 = kernel_physread_u64(ctx, base + offset + 8);
+  if (d2 == 0x910083fda9027bfd) {           // second 8 bytes of _stext
+    ctx->kernel.pbase = base + offset - 0x10000;
+    break;
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Once physbase is known, compute the kernel virtual with the linear map:
+
+```
+_stext = 0xffffffc008000000 + (Kernel Code & ~0xa8000000)
+```
+
+## Stabilizing to fast, reliable CPU-side kernel R/W (dirty pagetable)
+
+GPU R/W is slow and small-granularity. Pivot to a fast/stable primitive by corrupting your own process PTEs (“dirty pagetable”):
+
+Steps
+- Locate current task_struct -> mm_struct -> mm_struct->pgd using the slow GPU R/W primitives
+- mmap two adjacent userspace pages A and B (e.g., at 0x1000)
+- Walk PGD->PMD->PTE to resolve A/B’s PTE physical addresses (helpers: get_pgd_offset, get_pmd_offset, get_pte_offset)
+- Overwrite B’s PTE to point to the last-level pagetable managing A/B with RW attributes (phys_to_readwrite_pte)
+- Write via B’s VA to mutate A’s PTE to map target PFNs; read/write kernel memory via A’s VA, flushing TLB until a sentinel flips
+
+<details>
+<summary>Example dirty-pagetable pivot snippet</summary>
+
+```c
+uint64_t *map = mmap((void*)0x1000, PAGE_SIZE*2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
+                     MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
+uint64_t *page_map = (void*)((uint64_t)map + PAGE_SIZE);
+page_map[0] = 0x4242424242424242;
+
+uint64_t tsk = get_curr_task_struct(ctx);
+uint64_t mm = kernel_vread_u64(ctx, tsk + OFFSETOF_TASK_STRUCT_MM);
+uint64_t mm_pgd = kernel_vread_u64(ctx, mm + OFFSETOF_MM_PGD);
+
+uint64_t pgd_off = get_pgd_offset((uint64_t)map);
+uint64_t phys_pmd = kernel_vread_u64(ctx, mm_pgd + pgd_off) & ~((1<<12)-1);
+uint64_t pmd_off = get_pmd_offset((uint64_t)map);
+uint64_t phys_pte = kernel_pread_u64(ctx, phys_pmd + pmd_off) & ~((1<<12)-1);
+uint64_t pte_off = get_pte_offset((uint64_t)map);
+uint64_t pte_addr = phys_pte + pte_off;
+uint64_t new_pte = phys_to_readwrite_pte(pte_addr);
+kernel_write_u64(ctx, pte_addr + 8, new_pte, false);
+while (page_map[0] == 0x4242424242424242) flush_tlb();
+```
+
+</details>
+
+## Detection and hardening
+
+- Firmware/microcode: fix all sites masking $12 to use 0x7 (A7xx) and audit privileged packet gates
+- Driver: validate effective IB level for privileged packets and enforce per-context allowlists
+- Telemetry: alert if CP_SMMU_TABLE_UPDATE (or similar privileged opcodes) appears outside RB/IB0, especially in SDS; monitor anomalous bursts of 4/8-byte CP_MEM_TO_MEM and excessive TLB flush patterns
+- Kernel: harden pagetable metadata and detect user PTE corruption patterns
+
+## Impact
+
+A local app with GPU access can execute privileged GPU packets, hijack the GPU SMMU, achieve arbitrary kernel physical/virtual R/W, disable SELinux and obtain root on affected Snapdragon A7xx devices (e.g., Samsung S23). Severity: High (kernel compromise).
+
+## References
+
+- [CVE-2025-21479: Adreno A7xx SDS->RB privilege bypass to kernel R/W (Samsung S23)](https://xploitbengineer.github.io/CVE-2025-21479)
+- [Mesa freedreno afuc disassembler README (microcode + packets)](https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/blob/c0f56fc64cad946d5c4fda509ef3056994c183d9/src/freedreno/afuc/README.rst)
+- [Google Project Zero: Attacking Qualcomm Adreno GPU (SMMU takeover via CP packets)](https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/09/attacking-qualcomm-adreno-gpu.html)
+- [Dirty pagetable (archive)](https://web.archive.org/web/20240425043203/https://yanglingxi1993.github.io/dirty_pagetable/dirty_pagetable.html)
+
+{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/README.md b/src/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/README.md
index bfcee2d9c07..417de671982 100644
--- a/src/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/README.md
+++ b/src/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/README.md
@@ -57,6 +57,12 @@ Tools that could help to search for kernel exploits are:
 
 Always **search the kernel version in Google**, maybe your kernel version is written in some kernel exploit and then you will be sure that this exploit is valid.
 
+Additional kernel exploitation technique:
+
+{{#ref}}
+../../binary-exploitation/linux-kernel-exploitation/adreno-a7xx-sds-rb-priv-bypass-gpu-smmu-kernel-rw.md
+{{#endref}}
+
 ### CVE-2016-5195 (DirtyCow)
 
 Linux Privilege Escalation - Linux Kernel <= 3.19.0-73.8
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/xs-search/css-injection/less-code-injection.md b/src/pentesting-web/xs-search/css-injection/less-code-injection.md
index b9d599deb30..6d338df2b68 100644
--- a/src/pentesting-web/xs-search/css-injection/less-code-injection.md
+++ b/src/pentesting-web/xs-search/css-injection/less-code-injection.md
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-## LESS Code Injection leading to SSRF & Local File Read
+# LESS Code Injection leading to SSRF & Local File Read
+
+{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
 
 LESS is a popular CSS pre-processor that adds variables, mixins, functions and the powerful `@import` directive.  During compilation the LESS engine will **fetch the resources referenced in `@import`** statements and embed ("inline") their contents into the resulting CSS when the `(inline)` option is used.
 
@@ -59,4 +61,5 @@ curl -sk "${TARGET}rest/v10/css/preview?baseUrl=1&lm=${INJ}" | \
 
 * [SugarCRM ≤ 14.0.0 (css/preview) LESS Code Injection Vulnerability](https://karmainsecurity.com/KIS-2025-04)
 * [SugarCRM Security Advisory SA-2024-059](https://support.sugarcrm.com/resources/security/sugarcrm-sa-2024-059/)
-* [CVE-2024-58258](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-58258)
\ No newline at end of file
+* [CVE-2024-58258](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-58258)
+{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}